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of Convertible Security Calls
Wayne H. Mikkelson
7.1 Introduction
Several studies document a statistically significant decrease in the price of
firms' common stock at the earliest public announcement of certain types
of capital structure changes. For example, Masulis (1978) reports statisti-
cally significant negative average common stock returns at the announce-
ment of intrafirm exchange offers that involve the issuance of common
stock for debt, common stock for preferred stock, or preferred stock for
debt. Mikkelson (1981) reports a significant negative average common
stock return at the announcement of convertible debt calls that force
conversion of debt to common stock. Dann and Mikkelson (1984) and
Korwar (1982) also report a negative average return at the announcement
of the issuance of convertible debt and common stock, respectively. None
of these studies of capital structure changes, however, resolves the issue
of what factors determine the negative average stock price response. Nor
do they completely explain the motivation for these capital structure
changes.
This study attempts to shed light on these unresolved issues by investi-
gating potential determinants of negative stock price reactions to the
announcements of convertible debt and convertible preferred stock calls
that force conversion. The empirical analysis extends Mikkelson's (1981)
study of convertible security calls by estimating the cross-sectional rela-
tionship between abnormal common stock price responses to call
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announcements and variables that represent possible determinants of
stock price reactions. The variables are measures of the following effects
of calls: (1) the change in interest expense tax shields, (2) the potential
redistribution of wealth from common stockholders to preferred stock-
holders and debtholders, (3) the decrease in the value of conversion
privileges held by convertible securityholders, (4) the relative increase in
shares outstanding, and (5) the change in earnings per share.
The empirical results indicate that wealth redistribution from common
stockholders to debtholders has no measurable effect on stockholders'
wealth. Some evidence, however, suggests that the conversion of debt to
common stock alters the relative priority of outstanding preferred stock
claims sufficiently to affect share price. There is no evidence of an
association between common stock returns and decreases in the value of
called convertible securities at the announcements of calls. The potential
wealth transfers from convertible securityholders are typically quite small
relative to the market value of common stock. In addition, there is no
support for the notion particularly popular among practitioners that the
negative stock price response to call announcements is attributable to a
decrease in earnings per share or an increase in the supply of outstanding
shares.
The results reveal a positive association between the reduction in
interest expense tax shields and the announcement period common stock
returns. One interpretation is that the association between stock returns
and the corporate tax variable solely reflects the wealth impact of a
decrease in interest expense tax shields. This interpretation implies that
on average the market does not anticipate complete replacement of the
tax shields with a subsequent issuance of new debt, even though refinanc-
ing the called debt may be in stockholders' interests.
A second interpretation of this evidence recognizes that the negative
stock price response may reflect informaion about the calling firm's value.
This interpretation presumes that the decision to call and to reduce
financial leverage is in the interests of stockholders but is based on
information not reflected in the calling firm's security prices. For exam-
ple, a call decision may convey management's lowered assessment of the
firm's optimal level of interest payments or preferred dividends and
thereby convey management's reduced expectations about future earn-
ings. A convertible security call and the associated decrease in financial
leverage, therefore, can be viewed as a value-maximizing response to a
decrease in the firm's earnings prospects, even though the share price
reaction to a call announcement is negative.
Under the second interpretation, the evidence of a relationship be-
tween stock returns at the time of call announcements and changes in
interest expense tax shields may in part, or even entirely, reflect informa-
tion about the firm's value or earnings prospects. The results presented in267 Capital Structure Change
this study, however, do not resolve the extent to which the stock price
responses to call announcements reflect a tax effect versus an information
effect.
1
The paper is organized as follows: section 7.2 discusses possible deter-
minants of stock returns at the announcements of convertible security
calls. A specification of a cross-sectional relationship between common
stock returns and the possible determinants is also developed in this
section. Section 7.3 describes the sample of convertible security calls and
the empirical proxies for the possible determinants of stock returns.
Estimates of the cross-sectional relationship are presented in section 7.4.
Section 7.5 interprets the findings. The final section presents a summary
and the conclusions of the study.
7.2 Potential Determinants of Changes in
Stockholders' Wealth at Announcement of
Convertible Security Calls
This section discusses potential determinants of changes in stock-
holders' wealth in response to call announcements and develops a simple
model of the determination of the stock price response to call announce-
ments. A specification of the potential impact on common stockholders'
wealth, expressed as a return, is presented for the following effects of
convertible security calls: (1) a reduction in interest expense tax shields,
(2) an increase in the relative priority of a subset of claims senior to
common stock, (3) a reduction in the conversion premium of called
securities, (4) an increase in shares outstanding, and (5) a change in
earnings per share.
Several assumptions are made in developing a simple model of the
share price effects of a convertible security call. First, the calling firm has
three classes of securities outstanding: (1) callable convertible debt (CD),
(2) nonconvertible debt (D), and (3) common stock (CS). Second, the
value of the convertible debt (VCD) exceeds its call price and the optimal
response of the convertible bondholders is conversion. Third, the call is
unanticipated by the market.
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In expression (1), the market value of common stock (Vcs) immedi-
ately prior to the call announcement equals the total value of the firm
(VF) less the market values of the callable convertible debt {VCD) and the
remaining outstanding debt securities (VD):
(1) VCS=VF-VCD-VD.
Temporarily, it is assumed that the market value of convertible debt
equals its conversion value, which equals the product of the fraction of
outstanding shares issued on conversion (a) and the market value of
outstanding common stock. In (2), the market value of common stock is268 Wayne H. Mikkelson
expressed in terms of the number of shares outstanding (n) and share
price (P).
(2) nP=VF-a(nP)-VD
The pre-announcement share price, as given by (3), equals the differ-
ence between the value of firm and the value of senior securities divided
by the total number shares outstanding after conversion of outstanding
convertible securities:
(3) P=(VF-VD)/[(l + a)n].
The post-announcement share price (P') can be expressed as the differ-
ence between the post-announcement value of the firm (V'F) and the
value of outstanding senior securities (V'D) divided by [(1 + a)n],
(4) P' = {V'F-V'D)l[\ + a)n\.
Thus, the announcement period per share return (expression [5]) implied
by the pre-announcement and post-announcement share prices equals
the change in the difference between firm value and the value of se-
nior securities [A(VF - VD)] divided by the market value of shares,
including shares issued on conversion, prior to the call announcement
[(1 + *)nP],
(5) (F - P)IP = A(VF- VD)/[(1 + ot)nP].
The remainder of this section discusses several possible effects of a
convertible security call on stockholders' wealth and presents specifica-
tions of the potential effects on share price based on expression (5).
7.2.1 Reduction in Interest Expense Tax Deductions
If the calling firm has sufficient earnings to fully utilize the interest
expense tax deductions provided by convertible debt, ceteris paribus a
call reduces cash flows available to security holders. However, the net tax
effect of a reduction in debt outstanding on stockholders' wealth is
ambiguous. The net effect depends on whether the decrease in leverage is
expected to be temporary and on the extent to which the loss of corporate
tax benefits is offset by other types of tax shields or by the elimination of
costs, such as default-related costs and personal tax disadvantages associ-
ated with the called debt.
Various models of optimal capital structure that include corporate
taxes imply different valuation effects of a reduction in the amount of
debt outstanding. For example, Miller's (1977) analysis implies that for
any level of financial leverage of a firm, the loss in interest expense tax
deductions due to the conversion of debt is offset exactly by the gain of
eliminating interest payments that have been "grossed up" to provide
taxable debtholders with their required return net of personal taxes. As a269 Capital Structure Change
result, the conversion of debt to common stock and the reduction in
interest expense tax deductions have no effect on the wealth of common
stockholders.
DeAngelo and Masulis (1980) present an analysis of optimal capital
structure that incorporates uncertainty about a firm's ability to fully
utilize interest expense tax deductions. In their model, firms issue debt up
to the point where the marginal benefits of uncertain interest expense
deductions equal the marginal costs of debt. Consequently, a reduction in
financial leverage generally affects stockholders' wealth.
Assuming a call is completely unanticipated, a corporate tax effect of a
call announcement decreases firm value by an amount equal to the
present value of the change in interest expense tax shields (AT). Substi-
tuting AT into the numerator of the right-hand side of equation (5) gives
equation (6), the corporate tax effect expressed as a relative change in
share price:
(6) (F - P)IP = A77[(l + a)nP].
Miller's model implies that AT is exactly offset by the elimination of
personal tax disadvantages of debt, while DeAngelo and Masulis's model
implies that AT may be only partially offset by the reduction in debt
related costs. In equation (7), which incorporates the different predic-
tions of these models, the value of 7 is between zero and one, depending
on the marginal effect of a reduction in interest expense tax deductions on
firm value,
(7) (P
r - P)IP = 7(Ar)/[(l + a)nP].
Thus, the tax effect as measured by a return per share of common stock
equals the net marginal effect of a reduction in interest expense tax
deductions on firm value [7 (AT)] divided by the sum of the pre-
announcement value of common stock and the conversion value of the
called securities [(1 + a)nP].
7.2.2 Change in the Value of Senior Securities
An unanticipated announcement of a convertible debt call that forces
conversion may cause a wealth transfer from common stockholders to
preferred stockholders and debtholders. Any claims on the firm's assets
with a priority higher than common stock, but not higher than the called
debt, increase in priority relative to the debt claims converted to common
stock. Even if the firm's expected cash flows and asset structure are
unchanged by the call announcement, the value of a subset of claims
senior to common stock may increase due to the elimination of competing
debt claims. A corresponding decrease in the value of common stock
reflects a wealth transfer from common stockholders.
3
Holding the value of the firm constant in expression (5), the impact of a270 Wayne H. Mikkelson
change in the value of senior securities (AVD) on the value of common
stock is expressed as a return per share in (8):
(8) (P' - P)IP = - &VDl[(l + a)nP].
The relative price change equals the change in the value of senior secu-
rities divided by the product of the total number of shares outstanding
following conversion and the pre-announcement share price.
7.2.3 Transfer of Conversion Premium from
Convertible Securityholders
If prior to a call announcement the market does not fully anticipate the
timing of a call, the market value of convertible debt (VCD) in general
exceeds its conversion value (aVcs).
4 An effect of a call announcement is
to eliminate any conversion premium (VCD - OLVCS), SO that following
the call announcement the market value of convertible debt equals its
conversion value. The decrease in the market value of the called secu-
rities is a wealth transfer from the called securityholders to the remaining
securityholders of the firm.
Holding aside all other effects of a call announcement on the value of
the firm or on the value of senior securities, and assuming that the
transfer of the conversion premium is captured entirely by common
stockholders, the impact of a decrease in conversion premium on the
price of a share of common stock is given by (9):
(9) (P' - P)IP = (VCD - aVcs)/[(l + a)nP].
The total wealth of the convertible securityholders decreases by the
amount of the pre-announcement conversion premium (VCD — aVCs)
less the portion of conversion premium regained on conversion {[a/
(1 + a)] (VCD — aVcs)}. The quantity (1 + a) in the denominator of
expression (9) reflects the fact that only the fraction [1/(1 + a)] of the
conversion premium is captured by the holders of common stock claims
outstanding prior to the call.
7.2.4 Increase in Shares Outstanding
Some corporate officers and investment bankers attribute the negative
stock price reactions to call announcements to the eventual increase in
the number of shares outstanding. One price impact often cited is in
effect a movement along a downward-sloping demand curve for the
calling firm's shares. Also mentioned is a price effect due to a decrease in
earnings per share caused by conversion of the called securities. Both
effects lack rigorous support in theory. On the other hand, neither notion
has been tested thoroughly. For this reason, both potential effects are
examined in this study.271 Capital Structure Change
Supply Effect. If the demand for a firm's common stock is not perfectly
elastic, the increase in the number of shares outstanding due to conver-
sion of debt may explain some part of the decrease in share price at call
announcements. That is, if the common stock claims of the calling firm do
not have close substitutes, ceteris paribus an unanticipated increase in the
number of shares outstanding is associated with a detectable price de-
crease. On the other hand, if shares of common stock have perfect or very
close substitutes in the form of another security or a portfolio of secu-
rities, no significant price change is caused solely by an increase in the
number of shares outstanding.
Existing evidence does not support the notion of a supply effect on
share prices. Neither Scholes's (1972) examination of secondary distribu-
tions of common stock nor Marsh's (1979) study of U.K. rights offerings
of common stock uncovers evidence of price changes that depend on the
size of the offering. A study of convertible security calls differs from
Scholes's study in that calls result in an increase in the number of shares
outstanding, and also differs from Marsh's study in that a call does not
produce a direct change in the firm's asset structure. Estimation of the
relationship between abnormal common stock returns at the call
announcements and the ensuing increase in the number of shares out-
standing provides new evidence on the importance of a supply effect.
This study tests the hypothesis that the size of the relative increase in
the number of shares outstanding due to conversion (a) is unrelated to
the relative stock price change [(P' — P)/P] in response to call announce-
ments, adjusting for the possible price effects of corporate taxes and
wealth redistribution. However, no theory of price pressure or supply
effects exists that implies a particular specification of the relationship
between stock price and the quantity of shares outstanding. For this
study, therefore, only a general form relationship is specified. That is,
(F -P)/P = /(a) and/'(a)<0.
Failure to reject the null hypothesis is consistent with a perfectly elastic
demand for shares, that is, no supply effects. But since the test is based on
estimation of a cross-sectional relationship, there is an assumption of a
homogeneous relationship between common stock returns and the rela-
tive changes in shares outstanding for the sample of calling firms. If the
assumption of a homogeneous relationship is incorrect, the finding of no
relationship between the stock price responses and the relative increases
in shares outstanding may simply reflect an incorrect specification of the
test.
Earnings Dilution Effect. Financial economists generally argue that
there are no valuation effects attributable solely to changes in earnings
per share. Prevailing theory of capital structure in a setting of no taxes, as272 Wayne H. Mikkelson
first presented by Modigliani and Miller (1958), implies that to the extent
a reduction in earnings per share of common stock reflects a decrease in
expected cash flows per share due to a change in capital structure, there is
compensating decrease in the required return for common stock. That is,
changes in capital structure per se, even if they bring about a decrease in
earnings per share, do not necessarily affect shareholders' wealth.
The issuance of new shares due to conversion of convertible debt or
preferred stock reduces earnings per share, while the reduction in interest
expenses or preferred dividends increases earnings per share. Typically,
the net effect of a call and conversion is to reduce earnings per share.
After adjusting for the possible effects of corporate taxes and wealth
redistribution, the Modigliani-Miller theory predicts no price effect of a
change in earnings per share. Therefore, estimation of the cross-sectional
relationship between the stock price responses to call announcements
and the associated relative changes in earnings per share (\EPS/EPS),
taking account of the effects of corporate taxes and wealth redistribution,
provides an opportunity to test directly for a price effect due to dilution of
earnings per share.
5
7.2.5 Specification of the Cross-sectional Relationship
On the assumption that the possible determinants examined in this
section are additive, expression (10) is the cross-sectional relationship to
be estimated:
(10) (P' - P)IP = p0 + px [7(Ar)/(l + a)#iP]
+ P4 [/(a)] + p5 ([AEPS/EPS]).
A positive value of px is consistent with a corporate tax effect on share
price. An increase in the value of senior securities implies a positive value
for p2. Loss of a conversion premium by convertible securityholders
implies a positive value for (33. A supply effect is consistent with a
negative value for (34, while a positive value for (35 is implied by an
earnings dilution effect. The sample of calls and the empirical proxies for
the variables in (10) are described in the next section.
7.3 Data
7.3.1 Sample of Calls
The sample consists of 107 convertible debt calls and 57 convertible
preferred stock calls from the period 1962-78.
6 Each call announcement
is reported in the Wall Street Journal, and no other firm-specific news,
related or unrelated to the call announcement, is revealed by the Wall273 Capital Structure Change
Street Journal Index or the cited call announcement article. In every case,
the conversion value exceeded the call price at the time of the call
announcement. In addition, all of the firms were listed on the New York
or American Stock Exchange at the time of the announcement. Summary
statistics of the convertible security calls are discussed in the following
section.
7.3.2 Empirical Proxies for the Possible Determinants of
Changes in Stockholders' Wealth
The Relative Price Change at Announcement. An estimate of a 2-day
announcement period risk-adjusted common stock return is the empirical
measure of the stock price impact of a call announcement. Risk-adjusted
returns (ARjt) for firm / equal the difference between the unadjusted
stock returns (Rjt) and expected returns derived from firm y's market
model. That is, on day t
(11) ARjt = Rjt-{bQ + bxRMt),
where b0 and bx are coefficient estimates of the linear relationship be-
tween firm ;'s daily stock returns taken from the Daily Returns File
gathered by the Center for Research in Security Prices of the University
of Chicago (CRSP) and the daily returns of the CRSP Value-weighted
Index (RMI)-
1 The period used to estimate the parameters b0 and b1 begins
61 trading days following the date of the call announcement and ends 200
trading days following the announcement date.
8
Table 7.1 presents average adjusted common stock returns for 21
trading days centered on the date of the initial published report of the
call announcement (day 0). Column 1 presents the trading day relative
to day 0. For the sample of convertible debt calls, the average adjusted
daily returns are presented in column 2 and the percentage of positive
adjusted returns is presented in column 3. For the sample of convertible
preferred stock calls, the average adjusted returns and the percentage of
positive adjusted returns are presented in columns 4 and 5, respectively.
The stock price response to the announcements of convertible debt
calls appears to be confined primarily to trading days — 1 and 0. For the
sample of convertible debt calls, the average adjusted returns on days — 1
and 0 are large in absolute value relative to any of the surrounding trading
days. In addition, the relatively low percentage of positive adjusted
returns on days — 1 and 0 also implies an impact confined to these days.
Furthermore, over trading days +11 through + 60 no statistically signifi-
cant average adjusted returns are observed.
For the convertible preferred stock calls, no dramatic stock price
impact is observed on any day around day 0. However, on day — 1 only 18
of 57 adjusted returns are positive, which suggests a possible stock price



























Adjusted Daily Common Stock Returns
3 for 21 Trading Days
around the Date of the Earliest Published Report (Trading Day 0)
of Convertible Debt Calls (107 Events) and Convertible Preferred








































































































aAdjustment is the difference between raw daily stock returns and returns predicted by the
firm's market model. The estimate of the market model is based on the firm's raw daily
returns and the CRSP Value Weighted Index returns from trading days + 61 through + 200.
bDate of the earliest published report of the call announcement in the Wall Street Journal.
provide no evidence of a price impact on any other day nearby trading
day 0. Based primarily on the returns data for convertible debt calls, the
announcement period adjusted return for preferred stock calls is also
measured over trading days — 1 and 0.
9
The first row of panels A and B of table 7.2 presents summary statistics
of the 2-day announcement period adjusted returns {AR2a) for the sam-
ples of convertible calls. The mean 2-day adjusted return is -2.21% for
the convertible debt calls (row 1, panel A) and is - .44% for the converti-
ble preferred stock calls (row 1, panel B). The standard deviation and
range of AR2a are not markedly different between the two samples of275 Capital Structure Change
calls, but the hypothesis that the mean 2-day announcement period
returns of the samples are equal is rejected at the .01 level. For the
convertible debt calls, the hypothesis that the mean 2-day announcement
period return equals zero is rejected at the .01 level, but this hypothesis is
not rejected at .10 level for the convertible preferred stock calls. These
data imply a differential average impact of convertible debt and con-
vertible preferred stock calls on common stockholders' wealth. In the
course of data collection, however, no potentially relevant differences
were observed between the timing or content of convertible debt and
convertible preferred stock call announcements that might explain the
different average announcement period returns.
Change in Interest Expense Tax Deductions. Three estimates of the
reduction in interest expense tax shields are computed. The estimates are
based on different assumptions about the market's view of the perma-
nence or duration of the reduction in interest expense tax shields. The
assumptions range from the expectation of a 1-year decrease to a perma-
nent decrease in interest expense tax shields. No attempt has been made
to estimate the calling firm's effective marginal tax rates at the time of the
call announcements. For all three measures of the reduction in interest
expense tax shields, the calling firm's effective marginal tax rate is
assumed to equal .48.
The first estimate of the reduction in tax shields (TD) is the product of
the tax rate and the total face value of the called debt. This measure
presumes that removal of the debt portion of the called debt claims is a
permanent reduction in the amount of debt outstanding. Thus, TD
estimates the present value of a perpetual stream of interest expense tax
shields.
The second measure is the amount of annual interest expense tax
deductions (TI) provided by the called debt. This estimate equals the
product of the tax rate and the amount of annual interest payments of
the called debt issue. The assumption underlying this measure is that the
call of debt is viewed as only temporarily reducing the amount of avail-
able interest expense tax deductions. That is, the expected reduction
in the firm's cash flows equals the value of one year's interest expense
deductions.
The third measure is the product of the corporate tax rate and an
estimate of the present value of the remaining interest expenses of the
called debt (TPVI). The remaining interest payments are discounted by
the yield to maturity for corporate debt with a comparable Moody's
quality rating at the time of the call announcement. An implicit assump-
tion of this measure is that the expected duration of the reduction in
interest expense tax shields equals the time remaining to maturity at the
time of call announcement. Thus, the expected duration of the decrease276 Wayne H. Mikkelson
in interest expense deductions implied by this measure is less than for the
estimate TD but greater than for the estimate TPVI.
Summary statistics for the three measures of the change in interest
expense tax deductions are presented in rows 2, 3, and 4 of panel A of
table 7.2. Each of the tax variables shown in table 7.2 is measured relative
to the market value of common stock (Vcs) prior to the call announce-
ment. Data on the terms of the called debt issue and the number of shares
outstanding are obtained from Moody's manuals and the Wall Street
Journal. The common stock prices are taken from the Commercial and
Financial Chronicle or the Wall Street Journal. The mean value of the
estimate of the reduction in interest expense tax shields divided by the
market value of common stock is - .035 for TD/VCS, - .016 for TPVI I
Vcs, and -.002 for T1IVCS.
Change in the Value of Senior Securities. In general, a substantial
portion of a firm's senior securities, that is, debt and preferred stock, are
either privately held or publicly held and traded infrequently.
1
0 Unlike
common stock, therefore, it is not possible to obtain a direct measure of
the impact of a call announcement on the total value of senior securities.
Instead, a proxy for the impact of wealth redistribution among classes of
securityholders is used.
For a call of convertible debt, the change in the value of debt securities
that remain outstanding following the call (AVD) is assumed to depend on
the amount of debt called (AD) and the amount of debt relative to
common stock outstanding after the call (DIVCS). A general form
specification is
(12) AVD = h(AD, DIVcs),
where hi >0 and h2 >0. That is, the change in the value of outstanding
debt is greater, the larger the amount of debt called and the greater the
ratio of debt to common stock outstanding after the call. Similarly, the
impact on the value of outstanding preferred stock (AVPS) is assumed to
be a function of the amount of debt called (AD) and the amount of
preferred stock relative to common stock (PS/VCs) outstanding follow-
ing the call. That is,
(13) AVPS = k(AD, PS/VCS),
where kx > 0 and k2 > 0.
The intuition for the hypothesized signs of h1 and k± is that for a given
amount of outstanding debt or preferred stock, the greater the amount of
debt claims retired, the greater is the increase in the relative priority of
the remaining debt and preferred stock claims. Thus, the greater is the
impact on the values of outstanding debt and preferred stock. The
positive signs predicted for h2 and k2 reflect that for a given amount of277 Capital Structure Change
debt claims retired, the total dollar wealth redistribution from common
stockholders is expected to be larger, the greater is the relative amount of
debt or preferred stock claims that remain outstanding after the call.
For a call of convertible preferred stock, it is assumed that only the
relative priority of outstanding preferred stock claims is affected. The
general form expression for the impact on the value of preferred stock
(AVPS) is
(14) AVPS = £(APS, PS/Vcs),
where APS is the amount of preferred stock called and PS/VCS is the
relative amounts of preferred stock and common stock outstanding fol-
lowing the call. Based on the same intuition presented for expressions
(12) and (13), £1 and €2 are hypothesized to be positive.
Various specifications of h(-), k (•), and €(•) are employed in the
estimation of the cross-sectional relationship given by (10). For all of the
specifications, the amount of debt called (AD) equals the total face value
of the called debt and the amount of preferred stock called (APS) equals
the total liquidation value of the called preferred stock. The amounts of
preferred stock (PS) and long-term debt (D) that remain outstanding
after the call are also measured by the total liquidation value and total
face value, respectively. All of these data are obtained from Moody''s
manuals.
For the sample of convertible debt calls, row 5 of panel A in table 7.2
presents summary statistics for the change in the amount of debt out-
standing as measured by the ratio of the total face value of the called debt
to the market value of common stock (FVCDIVCS). The mean ratio is
- .073. Rows 6 and 7 present summary statistics for the total face value
and total liquidation value of remaining long-term debt and preferred
stock, respectively, divided by the market value of common stock. The
mean value of DIVCS is .400 and the mean value of PS/Vcs is .067. Row 2
of panel B gives summary data on the change in the amount of preferred
stock outstanding as measured by the ratio of the liquidation value of
called preferred stock relative to the market value of common stock. The
mean value of LVPSIVCS is -.081. Data on the liquidation value of
preferred stock outstanding following the call relative to the market value
of common stock is presented in row 3 of panel B. The mean ratio of
PSIVCS for preferred stock calls is .049.
Reduction in Conversion Premium. For only 77 of 107 convertible debt
calls and 46 of 57 convertible preferred stock calls, a market value of the
called securities can be measured within the 2 weeks immediately preced-
ing the call announcement. Rows 8, 9, and 10 of panel A of table 7.2
present the following summary statistics for these 77 convertible debt
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accrued interest) to the total conversion value of the called debt {VCDI
oiVCs),
n where both value estimates come from the same trading day, (2)
the ratio of the total market value of the called debt to its aggregate face
value (VCD/FVCD), and (3) the total dollar conversion premium, derived
from VCD and aVcs, divided by the market value of common stock
[(VCD-aVcs)/Vcs].
Corresponding measures for the calls of convertible preferred stock are
presented in rows 4,5, and 6 of panel B of table 7.2. Summary data on the
total market value of the called preferred stock divided by the aggregate
conversion value of the preferred stock (VPS/aVCs), measured from the
same trading day, is reported in row 4. The ratio of the value of the called
securities to the aggregate call value {VPSICPS) is summarized in row 5.
Data on the total dollar conversion premium divided by the market value
of common stock [(VPS — uVCs)/Vcs] is reported in row 6.
For each firm, the values of the common stock and the callable con-
vertible security are based on price quotations reported in the Commer-
cial and Financial Chronicle or the Wall Street Journal for the same day of
trading. The terms of the conversion privileges and the call provisions are
identified in Moody's manuals and the Wall Street Journal.
The mean ratio of market value to conversion value of the called
securities equals 1.018 for the convertible debt calls and equals 1.007 for
the convertible preferred stock calls.
1
2 These mean ratios are each signifi-
cantly different from 1.0 at the .05 level. Measured within the 2 weeks
Notes to Table 7.2
""Variable definitions are presented below.
TThese variables have negative values since they measure a decrease in tax shields or a
reduction in claims outstanding.
Variables:
y4/?2o = 2-day announcement period adjusted common stock return.
Vcs = market value of common stock prior to the call announcement.
TD = tax rate (.48) multiplied by the face value of the called debt.
77 = tax rate (.48) multiplied by annual interest payments of the called debt.
TPVI = tax rate (. 48) multiplied by estimate of the present value of remaining interest




e value of the called debt.
D = face value of long-term debt outstanding after the call.
PS = liquidation value of preferred stock outstanding after the call.
VCD = market value of called debt plus accrued interest prior to the call announce-
ment.
a^cs = conversion value of called securities prior to the call announcement.
a = relative increase in shares outstanding due to conversion of the called debt.
AEPS/EPS = relative change in earnings per share due solely to the call and conversion of
convertible securities.
LVPS = liquidation value of called preferred stock.
VPS - market value of called preferred stock prior to the call announcement.
CPS = aggregate call value of called preferred stock.280 Wayne H. Mikkelson
just prior to call announcement, the average ratio of conversion value to
face value of the called debt securities equals 1.628. The mean ratio of
conversion value to call payment value equals 1.597 for the convertible
preferred stock sample. As a proportion of the market value of common
stock, the average conversion premium is .0019 for convertible debt calls
and is .0001 for convertible preferred stock calls.
Based on these sample means, convertible debt and preferred stock
call policies appear to occur at similar times, as measured by the ratio of
market value to face value or call payment value of the called securities.
In addition, just prior to call announcements, both types of securities are
priced at similar premiums relative to conversion value.
1
3
Increase in Shares Outstanding. The measure of the relative increase in
the number of common shares outstanding (a) equals the number of
shares issued on conversion divided by the number of shares outstanding
prior to the call announcement. Data on shares outstanding and the
conversion terms of the called securities were collected from Moody's
manuals and the Wall Street Journal."
The mean relative increase in shares outstanding is .138 for the con-
vertible debt sample (row 11, panel A) and .136 for the convertible
preferred stock sample (row 7, panel B). The summary statistics indicate
that the distributions of a for the two samples are quite similar.
Change in Earnings per Share. The variable AEPS/EPS measures the
relative change in earnings per share due to conversion of the called
securities. That is, holding total earnings before interest and taxes con-
stant, AEPS/EPS measures only the effects of (1) an increase in the
number of shares outstanding and (2) a reduction in after-tax interest
expenses or preferred dividends.
1
5 Thus, AEPS does not measure any
change in earnings observed over time. The mean values of AEPS/EPS
are - .082 and - .053 for the convertible debt (row 12, panel A) and
convertible preferred stock (row 8, panel B) samples, respectively. The
earnings, interest payment, and preferred dividend data used to calculate
AEPS/EPS are obtained from Moody's manuals.
Based on the summary statistics presented in table 7.2, the samples of
convertible debt and convertible preferred stock calls are quite similar.
The most apparent differences are associated with the average 2-day
stock return (AR2a) and the corporate tax variables. Since no other
potentially important differences have been uncovered, a preliminary
conclusion is that the decrease in interest expense tax deductions, or an
associated factor, explains the larger negative average stock return at the
announcements of convertible debt calls.281 Capital Structure Change
7.3.3 Specification of the Estimated
Cross-sectional Relationship
Various specifications of the following linear regression model are
estimated for the sample of convertible security calls:
(15) AR2a = bQ + bx [TDI{\ + a)Vcs]
+ b2[h(AD, D/Vcs)/(1 + a) Vcs]
+ b3 [k(AD, PS/Vcs)/(1 + <x)VC5]
+ b4 [€(APS, PS/Vcs)/(I + <*)VCS]
+ b5[VCD-aVcs)/(l+a)Vcs]
+ t>6 [/(a)] + b7 [AEPS/EPS] + u .
In (15), the empirical proxies discussed in this section are substituted for
the variables in the cross-sectional relationship specified by (10), and u
represents a random error term that has a zero mean. The measures 77
and TPVI are substitute measures for TD, the change in interest expense
tax shields. For four terms in (15), a general form is given for the
relationship between AR2a and the proxy for a potential determinant of
the announcement period stock return. As reported in the next section,
several specifications of these terms are examined in estimating the
cross-sectional relationship.
For each of the potential effects, the null hypothesis tested is that the
coefficient of the corresponding independent variable in (15) equals zero.
A positive value of h i is consistent with a valuation effect associated with
the corporate tax variable. Defining h(-), k(-), and €(•) to have non-
negative values, negative values of b2, b3, and b4 are consistent with
wealth redistribution from common stockholders to more senior security-
holders. Negative values for b2 and b3 are consistent with wealth transfers
to debtholders and preferred stockholders, respectively, for calls of con-
vertible debt. A negative value of b4 is consistent with a wealth transfer to
preferred stockholders for calls of convertible preferred stock. A positive
value of b5 is consistent with a wealth transfer from the called convertible
securityholders to common stockholders. A negative value of b6 is consis-
tent with a supply effect, and a positive value of b7 is consistent with an
earnings per share dilution effect.
7.4 Estimates of the Cross-sectional Relationship
Estimates of the relationship given by (15) are presented in this sec-
tion. The cross-sectional relationship is estimated using different mea-
sures of the change in interest expense tax deductions and using different282 Wayne H. Mikkelson
specifications of the variables expressed in a general form in (15). The
cross-sectional relationship is also estimated for several subsets of the
calls.
7.4.1 Total Sample of Convertible Debt and
Convertible Preferred Stock Calls
Initially, ordinary least squares (OLS) estimates of the cross-sectional
relationship given by (16) are analyzed:
(16) AR2a = bo + b1 {TD/(1 + a)Vcs}
+ b2{[kD(D/Vcs)]/(l + a
+ b3{[&D(PS/Vcs)]/(l +
+ b5 {a} + b6 {AEPS/EPS} + u .
The joint hypothesis that the coefficients of (16) equal zero is rejected at
the .05 level. However, only the f-value for the coefficient of the interest
expense tax deductions variable (b^ is significant at the .05 level.
Given that the variance of common stock returns is not constant across
firms, there is reason to suspect that the error term of the regression
model is not homoscedastic. Tests on the residuals of the OLS estimates
of (16) indicate that the variance of the error term is positively related to
the standard deviation of the 2-day adjusted stock returns.
1
6 Thus, statis-
tical inferences based on the OLS results are possibly incorrect and the
OLS estimates are not presented in detail.
No evidence is found that suggests a relationship between the values of
any independent variable in (16) and the variance of the error term.
Therefore, in order to correct for heteroscedasticity, each 2-day adjusted
announcement period stock return (AR2a) is divided by an estimate of the
standard deviation (<r) of the calling firm's 2-day adjusted stock returns.
That is, standardized risk-adjusted announcement period returns {AR2J
<T) are regressed on the independent variables of (16).
1
7 Tests of the
residuals of the OLS estimates of the model with standardized adjusted
returns uncover no evidence of heteroscedasticity in the error term.
Therefore, all of the regression estimates presented in this section are
based on a dependent variable that is a standardized two-day return.
Table 7.3 presents OLS estimates of the cross-sectional relationship
where the dependent variable is a standardized common stock return.
The first three rows contain coefficient estimates of specifications that
differ only in terms of the measure of the change in interest expense tax
shields. In all three cases, however, the joint hypothesis that the coef-
ficients equal zero cannot be rejected at the .10 level.
The remaining results presented in table 7.3 are estimates for the
relationship between the standardized returns and the variable (s) that50 C
< i
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represents a particular potential determinant of the stock price response.
Rows 4, 5, and 6 present the estimates for the simple regression of the
standardized return on a measure of the change in interest expense tax
shields. In each case, the ?-value of the estimated coefficient is significant
at the .01 level, and the sign of the estimated coefficient is consistent with
a corporate tax effect. Row 7 presents the estimates of the relationship
between the standardized 2-day common stock return and the variables
that measure the possible effects of wealth redistribution. The F-statistic
for the regression is not significant at .10 level. The last two rows present
the estimates of simple regressions where the independent variable is the
measure of the relative increase in shares outstanding (row 8) or the
measure of the change in earnings per share (row 9). The f-statistic of the
estimated coefficient is not significant at the . 10 level for both regressions.
The estimated coefficient of AEPS/EPS also is not statistically significant
for the subset of 142 calls that were associated with a decrease in earnings
per share, that is, &EPS<0 .
The results presented in table 7.3 only provide support for a price effect
associated with the measure of the change in interest expense tax deduc-
tions. For all three measures of interest expense tax shields, the estimates
of the simple regression suggest that larger decreases in interest expense
tax deductions are associated with larger negative announcement period
stock returns. The results do not reveal valuation effects on common
stock that are attributable to wealth redistribution from common stock-
holders to preferred stockholders or debtholders. In addition, the evi-
dence does not support a supply effect or an earnings per share dilution
effect on share price.
Estimation of several alternative specifications of the cross-sectional
relationship confirms the results reported in table 8.3. For example, no
significant nonlinear relationship is found between the standardized com-
mon stock returns and the values of a or /^EPS/EPS. Four specifications
of each of the variables that measure the impact of calls on the value of
debt and preferred stock are also examined.
18. In only one instance, for
the variable that measures the impact of convertible debt calls on out-
standing preferred stock, is the t-value of an estimated coefficient signifi-
cant at the .05 level. The results presented in table 7.3, therefore, are
generally supported by the estimates of alternative specifications of the
model.
7.4.2 Subsets of the Calls Sample
Calls Associated with a Negative Stock Price Reaction. Each of the
independent variables in the cross-sectional relationships reported in
table 7.3 is a potential determinant of a negative share price response to a
call announcement. None of the coefficients implies a positive price285 Capital Structure Change
change. Therefore, a relevant determinant of the stock price response
may be missing from the model, especially for the calls associated with a
positive stock price response. In addition, a positive stock price response
may reflect a prior release of news of the call or it may reflect an accurate
prediction of the timing of the call by the market. If either of these
problems exists, the tests on the full sample of calls are likely biased
against rejecting the hypothesis of no price impact for each of the possible
determinants. Furthermore, a test of the residuals of the OLS estimates
rejects the hypothesis that the subsample of calls with positive stock price
responses and the subsample with negative stock price responses are
described by the same cross-sectional model.
1
9 For these reasons, the
cross-sectional relationship is estimated for the sample of calls with a
negative announcement period adjusted stock return.
Estimated coefficients for the subset of calls with a negative announce-
ment price response are reported in (17).
(17) [AR2a/&AR] = - 1.043 + 8.76{ro/(l + a)Vcs}
(-8.03) (1.69)
- 1.265{[AD(D/yC5)]/(l + a)Vcs}
(-.67)
- 11.578{[AD(PWC5)]/(1 + a)Vcs}
(-1.78)
+ 3.602{[AP(PS/Vcs)]/(l + a)Vcs}
(.35)
- .243{a} - .129{AEPS/EPS}
(-.29) (- .58)
/?
2(adj.) = . 121, F= 2.45.
For this subsample of 114 calls, the results are generally consistent with
the results for the full sample of calls. That is, the coefficient for the
variable that measures the change in interest expense tax deductions is
significant at the .05 level for a one-tailed test. In addition, no significant
^-values (presented in parentheses) are associated with the estimated
coefficients of variables that measure the relative increase in the number
of shares outstanding or the change in earnings per share. Thus, even
when only calls with negative stock price responses are examined, which
induces a bias against the null hypothesis of no significant relationship, no
support is found for a supply effect or an earnings dilution effect.
2
0
However, the coefficient of the variable that represents wealth redistribu-
tion from common stockholders to preferred stockholders due to calls of
convertible debt is significant at the .05 level. The coefficients of the other
two wealth redistribution variables are not significant at the .10 level.286 Wayne H. Mikkelson
Calls with Conversion Premium Data. Within 2 weeks preceding the
call announcement, a published price quotation for the called security is
found for 123 of the 164 calls. These price data are useful for two reasons.
First, an estimate of the difference between the market value and the
conversion value of the called security, that is, a conversion premium,
can be derived from the prices of the convertible security and the com-
mon stock. The total conversion premium of the called security, mea-
sured before the call announcement, represents a potential wealth trans-
fer from convertible securityholders to common stockholders. Second, to
some extent the size of a conversion premium reflects the market's
expectations about the timing of a call announcement. Estimates of
conversion premiums, therefore, may be helpful in identifying call
announcements that were a greater surprise to the market. Analysis of
calls associated with larger pre-announcement conversion premiums can
provide a stronger test of the potential determinants of stock price
responses to call announcements.
For the sample of 123 calls with conversion premium data, the regres-
sions reported in rows 1,2, and 3 of table 7.3 are augumented to include a
variable that measures the total conversion premium of the called secur-
ities [(VCD — ctVC5)/(l 4- a) Vcs]. However, the F-statistics of these
regressions are not significant at the .10 level.
Expressions (18) and (19) present the estimates of simpler versions of
the cross-sectional relationship that include a variable for the conversion
premium. In (18), the independent variables are measures of the effects
due to a permanent change in interest expense tax shields [TDI
1 + a) VCs]
 and the potential wealth transfer from convertible security-
holders [(VCD - aVC5)/(l + OL)VCS]. The f-statistics are in parentheses.
(18) [AR2JVAR] = ~ -431 + 11.086[rZ)/(l + a)Vcs]
(-2.48) (1.80)
- 28A79[VCD - aVcs)/(l + oc)Vcs]
(-.78)
2 = .041, F= 2.57.
The negative estimated coefficient for the variable that represents the
conversion premium is not consistent with a wealth transfer from the
called securityholders to stockholders. For the simple regression re-
ported in (19), the coefficient of the conversion premium variable is again
negative.
(19) [AR2a/&AR] = - .636 - 47.849[(VCD - aVcsVil + oi)Vcs] (-4.78) (-1.36)
7?
2(adj.) = .015, F= 1.85.287 Capital Structure Change
The failure to find evidence of a wealth transfer from convertible secu-
rityholders is not surprising, however, given the small estimated mean
value of the conversion premiums and the apparent measurement error in
the estimates of the conversion premiums, as indicated by the fact that 51
of the 123 estimates of the conversion premiums are negative.
The estimated coefficients of the cross-sectional relationship may de-
pend on the accuracy of the market's expectation of the timing of call
announcements. If calls with lower estimates of the pre-announcement
conversion premiums represent calls that were more accurately antici-
pated, ceterius paribus the 2-day announcement period returns are closer
to zero for these calls. As a result, more accurate anticipation of the
timing of call announcements tends to induce a downward bias in the
estimates of the coefficients of the variables that measure tax effects,




The possible effect of varying degrees of anticipation of call announce-
ments is examined by estimating the cross-sectional relationship on sub-
samples of calls grouped by the sign of the estimated conversion pre-
mium. Table 7.4 presents estimates of cross-sectional regressions for two
subsamples of calls. Panel A represents three sets of coefficient estimates
for the 72 calls with positive conversion premiums and Panel B presents
estimates for the 51 calls with negative conversion premiums.
The results presented in table 7.4 suggest that the estimates of the
coefficients depend on the sign of the conversion premium. For example,
the estimated coefficient of the tax variable [TDI{\ + a) Vcs] is greater
for the sample of calls with positive conversion premiums (row 3) than for
the sample of calls with negative conversion premiums (row 6). In addi-
tion, the coefficients for the wealth redistribution variables are all nega-
tive and one t-vahie is significant at .10 level for the sample calls with
positive conversion premiums. This is consistent with a valuation effect of
wealth redistribution. No significant ^-values are found among the esti-
mated coefficients for the sample of calls with negative estimated conver-
sion premiums. It should also be noted that the unexplained variance of
common stock returns, as indicated by R
2, is noticeably higher for the
subsample of calls with negative conversion premiums.
But even though the regression results appear to depend on the degree
of anticipation of calls, as measured by conversion premiums, the infer-
ences drawn from the regressions presented in rows 1,2, and 3 of table 7.4
are not markedly different from the inferences drawn from the results for
the full sample of calls. The ^-values for the estimated coefficients of
variables that represent the possible effect of wealth redistribution are
not significant at the .05 level. In addition, there is no evidence in table
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like the results for the full sample, the results for the sample of calls with
positive conversion premiums imply an impact on share price that is
associated with the decrease in interest expense tax shields.
7.5 Interpretation of the Results
The principal finding of the cross-sectional analysis is a positive and
statistically significant relationship between the announcement period
adjusted stock returns and measures of the change in interest expense tax
shields. One interpretation of this effect is that the negative stock price
response reflects the expected reduction in the firm's after-tax cash flows
due to a decrease in interest expense tax deductions. This interpretation
is consistent with the finding of a significant negative average stock price
reaction to convertible debt call announcements, but not to convertible
preferred stock call announcements. This interpretation is troublesome,
however, because it does not identify a benefit to securityholders of
calling convertible securities, and it raises questions about whether mana-
gers' call decisions are in stockholders' interests.
A second interpretation attributes some part of the apparent tax effect
to information about the calling firm's value that is implicitly conveyed by
the call decision. This interpretation presumes that the capital market
correctly believes that managers' call decisions are in the interests of
stockholders and are in part based on information that is not reflected in
security prices. Therefore, if the managers' assessment is that the net
benefits of a call and conversion are positive and the decision to call is
based on earnings prospects that are less favorable than those held by the
capital market, a call decision may convey unfavorable information about
the value of the firm. That is, a call announcement is associated with a
negative stock price reaction, even though the call decision is a positive
net present value decision based on managers' more complete informa-
tion.
According to the second interpretation, the variable that measures the
change in interest expense tax deductions may reflect both (1) a reduction
in tax shields and (2) a reduction in firm value due to information
conveyed by the call. For example, if the decision to call is motivated by a
lowered assessment of the amount of interest expenses that can be
supported by the firm's cash earnings and the capital market infers that
motivation from the decision to call, the decrease in share price reflects
both the reduction in interest expense tax shields and the expected
decrease in cash earnings. In that case a relationship between the price
response to call announcements and a measure of the reduction in in-
terest expense tax deductions is consistent with theories that imply the
optimal level of financial leverage depends on earnings coverage of290 Wayne H. Mikkelson
interest payments and utilization of available interest expense tax deduc-
tions.
This study does not resolve to what extent the results reflect a corpo-
rate tax effect or an effect due to information conveyed about firm value.
However, one piece of evidence supports an information effect. For the
sample of 57 calls of convertible preferred stock, further investigation
uncovers a significant relationship (at the . 10 level) between the common
stock returns at the announcements of preferred stock calls and the
amount of preferred stock called, as measured by liquidation value.
2
2
That is, even for convertible securities that provide no corporate tax
deductions, there is evidence that the stock price response to a call
announcement depends on the size of the issue called. This finding also
suggests that the larger negative stock price response to calls of converti-
ble debt than to calls of convertible preferred stock may reflect the effect
of a reduction in expected earnings that is reinforced by the effect of a
reduction in interest expense tax deductions. But in the final analysis,
whether the announcement period stock price responses reflect a down-
ward revision in expected earnings is left as an open issue.
2
3
The high frequency of estimates of negative conversion premiums just
prior to the call announcement suggests that many calls are anticipated
quite accurately. Therefore, the measured stock price responses in some
cases appear to reflect only a small revision in the expected timing of a
call. Furthermore, examination of the subset of calls with estimates of
positive conversion premiums (table 7.4) indicates that the magnitude of
the coefficient of the tax variable depends on the anticipation of the call
announcement. Consequently, the entire valuation effect associated with
the interest expense tax shields variable, that is, the price response that
would be observed if the call announcement were a complete surprise, is
probably larger than is suggested by the results presented in section 7.4.
Estimates of the conversion premium prior to the call announcement
also indicate that on average the potential wealth transfer from converti-
ble securityholders is small relative to the market value of common stock.
Within 2 weeks preceding the call announcement, the average total dollar
conversion premium equals $591,000, or 0.1% of the market value of
common stock. In addition, a wealth transfer from the called security-
holders is not found to be a significant explanatory variable for the stock
price responses to convertible security calls. Thus, the potential wealth
transfer from convertible securityholders does not appear to be an impor-
tant motivation for call decisions.
The results also do not provide strong support for a stock price impact
attributable to changes in the relative priority of debt and preferred stock
that remain outstanding following a call. Since convertible debt typically
is a subordinated debt claim, the shifts in the relative priority of debt
claims are probably minor. Therefore, it is not surprising that wealth291 Capital Structure Change
transfers to debtholders are not detected. For outstanding preferred
stock, conversion of debt to common stock replaces a higher priority
claim with a lower priority claim. Thus, the impact on the relative priority
of preferred stock is clearer. Some evidence reported in section 7.4 (see
notes 20 and 22) is consistent with a positive effect on the value of
preferred stock. The results for the sample of calls with negative stock
price responses (expression [17]) and for the sample of calls with positive
conversion premiums (panel A, table 7.4) also provide some support a
valuation effect on common stock due to a wealth transfer to preferred
stockholders. However, direct measurement of preferred stock price
responses for a subsample of announcements of convertible debt calls
does not uncover any price changes that are consistent with a wealth
transfer to preferred stockholders.
2
4 Thus, the results provide some sup-
port, but not strong support, for a valuation effect attributable to wealth
redistribution to preferred stockholders.
Finally, there is no evidence of price responses to convertible security
call announcements that are attributable to an increase in the number of
shares outstanding. The announcement period adjusted stock returns are
not related cross-sectionally to the relative increases in number of shares
outstanding that result from the call of convertible securities. This does
not support the notion of a supply effect on share prices. In addition, the
relationship between the common stock returns and the effect of the
convertible security calls on earnings per share is not statistically signifi-
cant. Contrary to arguments commonly presented by practioners, the
evidence does not support a price effect due to a change in earnings per
share.
7.6 Summary and Conclusions
This study investigates possible determinants of stock price reactions to
announcements of capital structure changes. Specifically, the study pre-
sents estimates of the cross-sectional relationship between risk-adjusted
common stock returns at the announcements of convertible security calls
that force conversion and variables that represent potential determinants
of the valuation effects of call announcements. The variables include
proxies for (1) the change in interest expense tax shields, (2) the change in
the relative priority of outstanding securities, (3) the wealth transfer from
the holders of called convertible securities, and (4) the increase in the
number of shares outstanding.
Estimation of a cross-sectional regression model provides evidence
that the stock price responses to convertible security call announcements
are related to measures of the decrease in interest expense tax deduc-
tions. The results, however, do not resolve to what extent this finding
reflects a valuation effect due to corporate taxes per se versus a valuation292 Wayne H. Mikkelson
effect due to information conveyed by call announcements. Weak evi-
dence consistent with a price effect due to wealth redistribution from
common stockholders to preferred stockholders is also found. The poten-
tial stock price effects of an increase in the number of shares outstanding
are not supported by the results.
Evidence of price effects related to a measure of the change in interest
expense tax deductions is consistent with the results of a similar study.
Masulis's (1983) cross-sectional study of both leverage-increasing and
leverage-decreasing intrafirm exchange offers also reports a positive
statistically significant relationship between announcement period com-
mon stock returns and a measure of the change in interest expense tax
shields. And he also interprets his results as being consistent with an
information effect. In view of Masulis's findings, the results presented in
this study of convertible security calls appear to reflect a general pattern
in stock price responses to capital structure changes. However, a com-
plete explanation of the motivation for capital structure changes requires
a better understanding of managers' incentives to make capital structure
decisions that convey unfavorable information about the value of the
firm.
Notes
1. This study does not address the interesting question of why the calling firms issued
convertible securities. The only rationale for the issuance of convertible securities that is
accepted generally among financial economists is that debt or preferred stock with conver-
sion privileges reduces costs associated with conflicts of interest between common stock-
holders and more senior securityholders (e.g., see Smith and Warner 1979). At this time,
however, there is no strong empirical support for this rationale. The results of this study of
convertible security calls, therefore, must be interpreted subject to not fully understanding
the motivation for the issuance of convertible securities.
2. Call announcements are not likely completely unanticipated, since calls of convertible
securities are not uncommon events. Prior to a call announcement, a firm's stock price
reflects both the probability of a call and the expected timing of a call. Thus, the stock price
response to a call announcement reflects only the revisions in the probability and expected
timing of a call. The importance of anticipation of call announcements is examined in sec.
7.4.2.
3. Smith and Warner (1979) discuss the notion that the issuance of debt with conversion
privileges mitigates the asset substitution incentive engendered by the issuance of debt
claims. Consequently, the call and conversion of convertible debt may be expected to
exacerbate this incentive and reduce the value of outstanding debt. However, Mikkelson
(1981) reports a positive, but statistically insignificant, return for straight debt during the
week of a call announcement. If there is any price impact on the value of outstanding debt, a
shift in the relative priority of outstanding claims appears to be the dominant effect on the
value of senior securities.
4. A nonzero probability of the conversion value being less than the face value of the
convertible debt prior to the expected expiration date of the conversion privileges implies293 Capital Structure Change
5. The notion of an earnings per share dilution effect on share price is not rigorously
developed in theory. Several corporate finance testbooks, however, present an alternative
to the Modigliani and Miller (1958) theory that implies a valuation effect of changes in
capital structure per se. Weston and Brigham (1978), for example, present the "net income
approach" to valuation of a levered firm that assumes the required return on common stock
is independent of financial leverage and implies reductions in leverage decrease sharehold-
ers' wealth. In the spirit of this valuation approach, an earnings dilution effect is specified
under the assumption that the firm PIE ratio is unaffected by a call of convertible securities
and a reduction in leverage. That is, before the call and conversion share price is
P = (c) (EPS) and after the conversion share price is P' = (c) (EPS
1), where c is a constant.
Earnings per share before and after the conversion are represented by EPS and EPS',
respectively. Thus, the potential earnings per share dilution effect is specified as
(P' - P)IP = (EPS' - EPS)/EPS = AEPSIEPS.
6. The sample of calls is derived from the sample formed for the time-series study of
security returns reported in Mikkelson (1981). Six calls are excluded from this study because
of the unavailability of financial data or stock return data following the call announcement.
7. In order to mitigate the bias in the OLS estimates of the market model due to
nonsynchronous trading of securities (see Scholes and Williams 1977), the estimate of bt is
derived from OLS estimates of the coefficients of R]t regressed on Rmt_r, Rmt, and
8. There are two reasons for using returns following the call announcement to estimate
each firm's market model. First, calls typically are announced following a period of gener-
ally positive risk-adjusted returns. These returns impart an upward bias to the estimation of
the parameters of the market model. Second, to some degree, if not completely, the
decrease in systematic risk of common stock due to conversion and a reduction in financial
leverage occurs on the call announcement date. Post-announcement returns should provide
estimates of the market model coefficients that more accurately reflect the reduction in
systematic risk at the announcement date.
9. Several recent investigations of security returns around announcements of capital
structure changes have also found a price impact that is concentrated on days — 1 and 0. For
example, see Dann (1981), Masulis (1980), Dann and Mikkelson (1984), and Korwar
(1982).
10. Among the 107 convertible debt calls, in only 19 cases did the calling firm have
publicly traded nonconvertible debt outstanding that traded actively enough to compute an
announcement week return. Publicly traded nonconvertible preferred stock was outstand-
ing in only 7 cases.
11. The purchaser of a bond pays interest accrued since the preceding coupon payment
date but receives no interest payments from the firm on conversion of the debt. Therefore, a
zero arbitrage profits condition implies that the sum of the convertible bond price plus
accrued interest is not less than the conversion value of the bond. The adjusted bond prices
are calculated under the assumption that the holder is entitled to 3 months of accrued
interest.
12. Several estimates of conversion premiums are negative. This need not reflect an
arbitrage profit opportunity. It may reflect either (1) nonsynchronous price quotes for the
firm's common stock and convertible debt or (2) the assumption of 3 months worth of
accrued interest (see n. 10). Investigation of a number of estimates of negative premiums
and precise measurement of accrued interest indicates that nonsynchronous prices are likely
the more important reason for the negative estimates of conversion premiums.
13. The hypothesis that the mean ratios of market value to conversion value are equal
for the two samples is not rejected at the .10 level.
14. The actual number of called securities converted to common stock is not easily
determined. Instead, it is assumed for the sample of calls that a large, constant proportion of294 Wayne H. Mikkelson
called securities are converted rather than redeemed at the call price. Table 7.3 indicates
that for calls of convertible debt, on average the price per called bond is more than $60
greater than its face value. This suggests that on average the conversion value exceeds the
call price by approximately $50 per bond. Thus, the incentive of a bondholder to convert is
substantial.
15. Earnings per share (EPS_ i) at the fiscal year end preceding the call announcement
equals net income (£_i) less preferred dividends (PD_j) divided by the number of
outstanding shares of common stock (PD_1), i.e., EPS = (£_i - PD-i) I 5_j. This
measure of earnings per share is the denominator of (AEPSI EPS). Following a convertible
debt call announcement, earnings available to common stockholders equal net income for
the preceding fiscal year (£_i) less preferred dividends (PD_!) plus the annual after-tax
interest payments on the called debt [(1 - t)Ic]. Earnings per share equals this quantity
divided by the total shares outstanding following the call and conversion (5_ a + AS). Thus,
the change in earnings per share (A£PS) due to the call and conversion of debt equals
A£PS = [(£_! - />£>_! + (1 - 0/c)/(5-a + AS)] - [(£_j - PZ)_1)/5_1].
For a call of convertible preferred stock, earnings available to common stockholders
increases by the annual preferred dividends (PDC) of the called issue. The change in
earnings per share due to a call of convertible preferred stock equals
AEPS = [£_! - PZ)_! + PDc)/(5_! + AS)] - [(£_! - PI>_1)/5_1].
16. The estimate of the standard deviation of the 2-day announcement period adjusted
return (vAR) equals the standard deviation of the 25 2-day risk-adjusted returns from
trading days +11 through + 60. Using this estimate, two tests of homoscedasticity are
computed.
The first, proposed by Goldfield and Quandt (1965), involves ranking the observations
by the estimate of the standard deviation of 2-day adjusted returns and estimating the
cross-sectional relationship separately on the 60 observations with the smallest values of
&AR and the 60 observations with the largest values of uAR. The ratio of the sum of squared
residuals of the two regressions has the F-distribution. For two sets of estimates of the
specification given by (16), the F-value of the ratio of the sum of squared residuals equals
3.47. The hypothesis of a homoscedastic error term is rejected at the .01 level.
The second test, presented by Glejser (1969), regresses the absolute value of the
regression residuals (|e|) on the estimate of the standard deviation of the 2-day adjusted
common stock return (<JAR)- The estimated relationship is \e\ = .006 + .703(6^) and the
r-value of the slope coefficient is 4.16. Again, the hypothesis of homoscedasticity is rejected
at the .01 level.
17. An alternative procedure to correct for heteroscedasticity is to divide each of the
terms of the regression by &AR. For reasons that are not clear, this weighted least squares
procedure induces another source of heteroscedasticity in the error term. The residuals of a
weighted least squares regression are related significantly to the independent variable that
measures the change in interest expense tax deductions. This problem is not found when
only the dependent variable is divided by &AR.
18. For the measure of the impact of a convertible debt call on outstanding preferred
stock, the following specifications of k(-) are examined: (1) [AD
2(PS/VCS)], (2)
[AD
 5(PD/VCS)], (3) [kD(PS/Vcs)
2], and (4) [kD(PS/Vcs)
5]. Corresponding specifica-
tions were also examined for the other two variables that represent the potential wealth
redistribution from common stockholders to debtholders or preferred stockholders.
19. For the 114 observations where AR^ < 0, the sum of the squared residuals of the
regression model given by (16) equals 78.7. The sum of squared residuals equals 293.6 for
the full sample of calls. An F-statistic is computed to test the hypothesis that the two samples
of calls grouped by the sign of AR2a are explained by the same cross-sectional relationship.
The F-statistic equals 5.84, which is significant at the .01 level.295 Capital Structure Change
20. Regressions that correspond to the specifications presented in rows 4-9 in table 7.3
are estimated for the subset of 114 calls with AR2a < 0. The results show a significant
coefficient for each of the three corporate tax variables and insignificant coefficients for the
variables that measure the relative increase in shares outstanding and the change in earnings
per share. The only departure from the results for the full sample is the finding of a
significant negative coefficient for the variable that measures the impact of a convertible
debt call on the value of outstanding preferred stock. This result is consistent with a wealth
redistribution effect.
21. No patterns were uncovered in the magnitudes of the estimated conversions pre-
miums. For example, the correlation between the estimates of the conversion premium and
the ratios of conversion value to face value, or call value (a measure of how much the
conversion privileges are in the money), is found to be insignificant. Also, no relationship is
found between the conversion premiums and the corporate tax variables.
22. For the sample of 57 calls of convertible preferred stock, the standardized 2-day
announcement period stock returns were regressed on the liquidation value of the preferred
stock divided by the market value of common shares [LV/(1 + OL)VCS] . The following
estimates were obtained
[AR2a/dAR] = - .038 + 4.133 [LV7(1 + a)Vcs],
(-.16) (1.60)
R
2 (adj.) = .044, F= 2.55.
23. If managers act to maximize stockholders' wealth, a conjecture is that calls moti-
vated by unfavorable inside information about the firm's value are more likely to occur
when the conversion value is closer to the call price. That is, the value of the downside
protection offered by the debt component of a convertible bond is greater, the lower is the
conversion value. Thus, the expected valuation impact of a call that conveys unfavorable
information is possibly greater at lower conversion values. However, investigation of the
calls indicates that the stock price response to call announcements does not depend on the
level of conversion value relative to call price.
24. For 19 calls of convertible debt, the calling firm had a publicly traded preferred stock
issue outstanding at the time of the call announcement. A total sample of 30 preferred stock
issues was formed that consists of 8 nonconvertible issues and 22 convertible issues. Average
daily preferred stock returns for these two samples of preferred stock issues are examined
over 21 trading days centered on the call announcement date. For neither sample is a
significant average preferred stock return found on or nearby the date of the call announce-
ment.
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Comment Michael C. Jensen
Professor Mikkelson's paper is a valuable documentation of an interest-
ing empirical phenomenon, and I have no serious criticisms of his work.
Unfortunately, in the time available I also have had great difficulty in
finding insights to add to his analysis. His evidence, along with the
evidence of others that continues to emerge, presents a fascinating puzzle
that is a nontrivial task to sort out.
Mikkelson's evidence provides some support for the existence of tax
Michael C. Jensen is La Clare Professor of Finance Business Administration and director
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effects. In particular, the significantly negative common stock returns
associated with calls of convertible debt are consistent with the hypoth-
esis that increased taxes resulting from the reduction in the debt interest
tax shield lowers the value of the firm. The insignificant stock returns for
calls of preferred stock strengthen the results because in this case there is,
of course, no reduction in tax shields. Furthermore, the significant cross-
sectional relation between the size of the reduction in the interest tax
shield and the size of the reduction in stock value is also consistent with
the tax hypothesis. On the other hand, the fact that there is also a
significant relation between stock returns and the amount of preferred
stock called is inconsistent with a tax effect.
Mikkelson points out that the evidence is also consistent with an
"information effect," which would occur if the call conveys information
to the market that implies the firm's value is lower. At the current time, if
forced to choose, I would opt for the tax hypothesis, but the answer is far
from clear.
I have some doubts about the information effect hypothesis. It has
become fashionable recently to give the label "information effect" to
those things we do not understand. In the past "transactions cost effect"
was a popular label for many ill-understood phenomena. I hasten to add
that I believe real information effects exist. However, as a logical matter,
there will always be an "information hypothesis" that is consistent with
any evidence on the presence of tax effects. In the absence of more
structure to the information hypothesis, I remain skeptical.
In addition, as Mikkelson points out, his evidence is consistent with
other evidence that generally indicates a negative value effect for various
capital structure changes—evidence that makes the puzzle even more
complicated and interesting. Masulis (1980a) finds negative stock returns
associated with exchanges of stock for debt, stock for preferred and
preferred for debt. There is also evidence of negative returns associated
with the issuance of convertible debt (Dann and Mikkelson 1982) and
with the issuance of common stock (Korwar 1981). On the other hand,
Masulis (19806), Dann (1981), and Rosenfeld (1982), find that stock
repurchases are associated with price increases. These positive stock
returns are inconsistent with a simple information hypothesis that pre-
sumes that the repurchase signals the lack of profitable investment proj-
ects. I also doubt that the tax hypothesis can explain all these phe-
nomena. Even if tax effects were found to "explain" the value declines, it
is difficult to understand why these capital structure changes occur.
Simple theories based on conflict of interest between managers and
stockholders are difficult to believe for several reasons—not the least of
which is the difficulty in understanding how managers benefit from each
of these changes. There is, however, at least one situation where the
manager-stockholder conflict of interest view does seem to make sense.298 Wayne H. Mikkelson
Contrary to the situation for unconditional stock repurchases studied
by Dann, Rosenfeld and Masulis, stock prices fall in the cases studied by
Dann and DeAngelo (1983) and Bradley and Wakeman (1983) where
repurchases are targeted to particular large block holders. These targeted
repurchases are commonly associated with the cancellation of a takeover
attempt, and the value decline appears to result from the premium paid to
the large block holder and from the lost merger benefits to the prospec-
tive target shareholders.
Mikkelson's work highlights our ignorance about why firms call con-
vertible securities—especially if such calls are associated with a negative
effect on firm value. It is useful to keep in mind that his estimated 2%
stock price decline is not large in economic terms even if it is statistically
significant. However, as Mikkelson points out, there is reason to believe
this is a downward-biased estimate of the size of the effects. There is no
evidence that managers benefit from calling convertible securities, and if
they do, we have no coherent ideas about how those benefits arise. In
considering these issues, it is useful to take a broad view of the problem.
There is other evidence on potential management exploitation of stock-
holders that gives little or no indication that stockholders are hurt by
management actions that appear on the surface to present conflicts of
interest. It is alleged that stockholders are harmed when firms change
their state of incorporation to Delaware—the state which provides the
fewest constraints on corporate charter provisions. The study by Dodd
and Leftwich (1980) indicates, however, that stock price increases, not
decreases, are associated with changes of state of incorporation to Dela-
ware. In addition, the studies by DeAngelo and Rice (1983) and Linn and
McConnell (1983) provide little or no evidence of harm to stockholders
when antitakeover charter amendments are adopted. In addition,
DeAngelo et al. (1984) find, contrary to popular allegations, that outside
stockholders experience substantial wealth gains in "going private" or
"minority freezeout" transactions. In such transactions the public stock
interest in a firm is replaced with full equity ownership by an incumbent
management group.
I believe that, as Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue, the firm is best
viewed as a legal fiction that serves as a nexus for a complex set of
contracts among disparate individuals. Its behavior is best thought of as
the equilibrium behavior of a complex system and not as that of a simple
choosing entity with preferences. We are only now beginning to under-
stand some of the complex forces at work inside the modern corporation,
and it is an understatement to say we have far to go. In Jensen (1983) I
discuss the fundamental building blocks of the emerging theory of orga-
nizations and some related methodological issues. Until we have a better
developed theory of the corporation, it will remain dangerous to draw299 Capital Structure Change
firm conclusions about such issues as tax effects or information effects
from results like those presented by Mikkelson. It is not hard to construct
scenarios in which such evidence reflects an entirely different set of causal
factors. For example, the evidence might reflect nothing more than the
decision rule used by managers to decide when to call convertible issues.
Suppose managers act to maximize firm value and call convertibles when
forecasts of future cash flow prospects are unfavorable. Suppose also that
the decision to call the convertible provides no new information to the
market regarding such cash flow prospects because the market receives
the unfavorable information at the same time as the issue is called. In
such a situation the price decline is due to neither tax or information
effects. I do not believe this scenario is correct, but it illustrates the
problem.
There is little doubt that we have come a long way since the early
breakthroughs in finance starting with capital budgeting in the 1940s and
early 1950s and moving on with efficient markets, portfolio theory,
capital structure theory, asset pricing theory, contingent claims pricing
theory, and agency theory. However, even though our theory and evi-
dence is vastly richer than the earlier models that primarily told us
"nothing matters," it is clear we are a long way from understanding how
and why things work in the world of corporate finance. This conference
and others like it that contribute to our stock of empirical knowledge give
us new insights into the fascinating world around us. They also give us
new puzzles in the from of evidence that is inconsistent with established
beliefs and facts that we simply do not understand. Corporate finance is
clearly a growth area, and I expect to see much progress in the future.
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